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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
INTERDEPENDENCIES IN CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT: RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES
by
Rimi Zakaria
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Sumit Kundu, Co-Major Professor
Professor William Newburry, Co-Major Professor
A substantial amount of work in the field of strategic management has attempted
to explain the antecedents and outcomes of organizational learning. Though multinational
corporations simultaneously engage in various types of tasks, activities, and strategies on
a regular basis, the transfer of organizational learning in a multi-task context has largely
remained underexplored in the literature. To inform our understanding in this area, this
dissertation aimed at synthesizing findings from two parallel research streams of
corporate development activities: strategic alliances and acquisitions. Structured in the
form of two empirical studies, this dissertation examines: 1) the strategic outcomes of
alliance experience of previously allying partners in terms of subsequent acquisition
attempts, and 2) the performance implications of prior alliance experience for
acquisitions. The first study draws on the relational view of inter-organizational
governance to explain how various deal-specific and dyadic characteristics of a
partnership relate to partnering firms’ post-alliance acquisition attempts. This model
theorizes on a variety of relational mechanisms to build a cohesive theory of inter-

vii

organizational exchanges in a multi-task setting where strategic alliances ultimately lead
to a firm’s decision to commit further resources. The second study applies organizational
learning theory, and specifically examines whether frequency, recency, and relatedness of
different dimensions of prior alliances, beyond the dyad-level experience, relate to an
acquirer’s superior post-acquisition performance. The hypotheses of the studies are tested
using logistic and ordinary least square regressions, respectively. Results analyzed from a
sample of cross-border alliance and acquisition deals attempted (for study I) and/or
completed (for study II) during the period of 1991 to 2011 generally support the theory
that relational exchange determines acquiring firms’ post alliance acquisition behavior
and that organizational routines and learning from prior alliances influence a future
acquirer’s financial performance. Overall, the empirical findings support our overarching
theory of interdependency, and confirm the transfer effect of learning across these
alternate, yet related corporate strategies of alliance and acquisition.
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INTERDEPENDENCIES IN CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT: RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES

DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION
Firms seeking to strategically combine their resources with those of other firms often
follow two popular alternative governance structures: strategic alliances or acquisitions (Wang
and Zajac, 2007). Decades of research by strategic management researchers suggest
substantial degree of similarity in the factors of antecedents, processes, and outcomes in both
alliance and acquisition activities. Numerous studies (Arend, 2004; Porrini; Wang and Zajac)
expressed that these parallel firm activities are potentially interdependent. Despite this
potential interdependence, until very recently, strategic management literature addressed
alliance and acquisition activities as two discrete or parallel streams (Reur and Arino, 2007).
Only a handful of very recent studies (Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz, and Croson, 2012; Zaheer,
Hernandez, and Banerjee, 2010) indicated that these two corporate development activities may
have substantial overlap. In an endeavor to seek their inter-relationships, this dissertation takes
an integrative approach and proposes the two empirical studies synthesizing both alliance and
acquisition research.
Strategic alliances are arrangements between two or more independent firms that
choose to carry out a project or to jointly manage in a specific business area by
coordinating the necessary resources and capabilities rather than either operating
independently or sharing their operations (Dussauge and Garrette, 1997; Dussauge,
Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000). Whereas acquisition activities are those deals where a firm
purchases a second firm – though the medium of exchange (e.g., cash, stock) and degree
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of ownership of this purchase may vary (e.g., buying a small equity, controlling share,
majority share, full ownership). According to King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004), the
most general theoretical motivation for firms engaging in M&A activity is the firms’
pursuit of creating synergy (i.e., the notion that the sum of merging two firms is greater
than their individual parts).

This dissertation is structured in terms of two empirical studies addressing two
interrelated, yet distinct sets of hypotheses. The rest of this document therefore bifurcates into
two standalone articles. Before we proceed to the articles, the following is an overarching
framework that represents the research models of this dissertation (illustrated by Figure 1:
Overarching Framework of the Dissertation):
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STUDY I:
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DYADIC AND DEAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
PARTNERSHIP AND POST-ALLIANCE ACQUISITION ATTEMPT

INTRODUCTION
Although the competencies and learning processes relating alliance and merger &
acquisition (M&A) activities are two well developed bodies of research in strategic
management, the potential interdependencies of learning across these corporate activities
have been underexplored (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Zeira and Newburry, 1999; Newburry
and Zeira, 1997). Arend (2004) expressed that alliances and M&As can be considered
related corporate activities and, therefore, are worthy of studying collectively. In fact,
prior research suggests that a substantial number of strategic alliances go through postalliance governance adjustments and other dynamic changes (Reuer and Zollo, 2005;
Reuer, Zillo, and Singh, 2002; Reuer and Zollo (2000), including ending in M&A
(Kogut, 1991; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Garette and Dussauge, 2000). The phenomenon of
using alliances as a screening tactic for acquisitions is also documented in the literature
(e.g., Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Nanda and Williamson, 1995). It is still largely
under-explained as to what factors or mechanisms result in such a post-alliance M&A
attempt in an interfirm partnership. In an attempt to integrate these two bodies of
research, we examine the underlying factors in strategic alliances that may explain a
firm’s post-alliance M&A strategy with an alliance partner. Drawing upon organizational
learning theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988) and the relational
view (Dyer and Singh 1998 Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) of
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interfirm partnerships, the theoretical model of our study examines how organizational
learning from prior partnering experience in alliance activities and other partnershipspecific factors (Gulati, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999 and 2002;
Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006) associate with a focal firm’s post-alliance
strategy. More specifically, we seek to examine how deal-specific and dyadic factors of
an alliance relate to a firm’s future M&A strategy.
Given that alliances and acquisitions involve two or more firms creating an interorganizational context of transactions, analyzing only focal-firm characteristics to
understand this dyadic phenomenon provides us with a one-sided and incomplete view of
a dyadic phenomenon (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Taking individual firm characteristics
makes us underestimate the relational aspects of two firms’ preferences and interactions
that are critical for determining the process of their resource combination (Zajac and
Olsen, 1993). This narrow analysis is likely to be misleading or at least incomplete when
our outcome variable may be a byproduct of the said partnership. Therefore, we are
interested in exploring how endogenous factors to a dyadic relationship may relate to a
focal firm’s post-alliance strategic action to acquire a partner.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following sections. First, I review the
literature on organizational learning and the relational view with particular focus on
strategic alliance and M&A activities. Second, I formulate a conceptual model and
develop a wide range of hypotheses pertaining to dyadic and deal specific aspects to
establish a relationship between an alliance agreement and a focal firm’s potential M&A
attempt. Third, a research design is presented elaborating on the sample, variables,
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measures, and statistical techniques. The concluding section articulates some potential
limitations, originality, and theoretical contributions of the study.

THEORETICAL BACKDROP: STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND ACQUISITIONS
Partner selection in inter-firm alliance and target selection in acquisition contexts
has been a well-established stream of research in strategic management. Numerous
studies have studied the determinants of firms seeking to join partnerships and acquire
other firms as two parallel research streams. However, in this study, we consider an
interdependent model, where we focus on only those acquisition attempts where the
acquiring and target firms had a prior alliance with each other, which likely influenced
their decision to undertake an acquisition deal.
Alliance Preceding Acquisition
Prior work suggests that strategic alliances sometimes end in acquisitions (Kogut,
1991; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Garette and Dussauge, 2000). Consistent with these
empirical findings, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 247) noted that in many cases,
collaboration serves as the first productive step toward understanding the environment,
market, or industry before an acquisition. Bowman and Hurry (1993) have also suggested
that firms can use prior alliances as intermediate strategic options to eventually acquire a
partner. However, none of the above-mentioned studies examined which factors induce
post-alliance acquisition attempts. Few theoretical arguments (besides very recent
exceptions, e.g., Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banarjee, 2010) have
been proposed to guide research on how relational characteristics of firm dyads interact
to impact the partnering firms’ post-alliance strategies in related corporate development
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activities. But, it is evident from the nature of alliance and acquisition deals that there
seems to be a natural increase in commitment of firm resources from alliances (i.e., less
resource intensive) to acquisitions (i.e., more resource intensive in terms of holding a
majority share of equity). Therefore, we attempt to address these evocative gaps in the
strategy literature by examining how firms’ dyadic experience and exchange associate
with their post-alliance acquisition attempts.
Distinction between Alliance and Acquisition
Broadly speaking, strategic alliances are arrangements between two or more
independent firms that choose to carry out a project or operate in a specific business area
by coordinating the necessary skills and resources jointly rather than either operating
independently or sharing their operations (Dussauge and Garrette, 1997; Dussauge,
Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000). Whereas acquisitions are those deals where a firm
purchases a second firm, though the form (e.g., cash, stock) and degree of ownership
(e.g., controlling share, majority share, full ownership) of such purchase may vary.
According to King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004), the most general theoretical
motivation for firms engaging in M&A activity is the firms’ pursuit of creating synergy
(i.e., the notion that the sum of merging two firms is greater than their individual parts).
Strategic alliances can take different forms: non-equity contractual alliances (CA),
minority-equity alliances (EA), and joint ventures (JV), where the latter one involves
establishing a formal legal entity. A JV or EA allows partners to share equity control,
while in a non-equity CA the partners neither share equity control as in a minority-equity
investment nor create a new organizational entity as is done in a JV. Furthermore, even in
JVs that involve equity investment, the determinants of distribution of ownership among
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partners remain inconclusive (Cuypers and Martin, 2010). In a recent study, Phene and
Tallman (2012) found that coordination characteristics in an alliance and some contextual
factors influence alliance formation and the level of equity investment. Evidently, given
the nature of these governance modes, it can be a muddy task to definitively distinguish
strategic alliance deals from acquisitions. In the interest of this study, an equity cut-off is
used for only for non-JVs to differentiate between alliances and acquisitions. We
followed the distinction adopted by Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banarjee (2010). They
considered a deal to be an acquisition if an acquiring firm obtained a majority of the
target’s equity (50.1%); any other types of equity or non-equity deals, including JVs, are
included as alliance deals.
Relevant Theoretical Frameworks
Relational Mechanisms
One dimension of alliance relationships that has received considerable empirical
attention in the last few decades is the extent to which firms are similar or related to their
alliance partners (Saxton, 1997, Hull, Slovinsky, Wharton, and Azimi, 1988; Westney,
1988) and how this influences alliance outcomes. In this research stream, scholars have
indicated the importance of firm-specific, partner-specific, and relational attributes that
make an inter-firm alliance successful. Within this theoretical tradition, the relational
view of inter-firm relationship (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Hatch, 2006) suggests
that value creation in an inter-organizational context is contingent upon the existence of
effective relational mechanisms, such as relation-specific investments, knowledge
sharing, complementary partner resources, and routine-building. Furthermore, Lane and
Lubatkin (1998) coined the term relative absorptive capacity, defined as the ability of a
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focal firm to recognize and assimilate valuable information and knowledge from a
partner. Relative absorptive capacity has been found to be an important prerequisite for
value creation in an inter-firm exchange.
Organizational Learning
Scholars of organizational learning have long theorized that corporate strategies
are influenced by activities that stem from: a) organizational routines based on the
interpretation of the past (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982), b) historydependent actions that provide feedback about outcomes (Lindblom, 1959; Steinbruner,
1974; Greve, 2003) and c) relations between organizational outcomes and future actions
based on those outcomes (Simon, 1955; Siegel 1957; Olsen, 1976).
The widely prevalent term "routine" includes the rules, procedures, conventions,
practices, strategies, and technologies that are adopted by organizations and through
which they conduct their day-to-day operations. It may also include norms, belief
structures, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that strengthen,
elaborate, and contradict the formal routines. Routines may originate at the level of an
individual cognition or behavior, but based on their frequency of use, they may gradually
become independent of the individual actors who execute them, and expand up to the
boundary of an organizational and inter-organizational context. However, it is important
to recognize that under certain circumstances, organizational experience and routines are
not conserved in their entirety. Knowledge, learning, and routines may disappear from an
organization’s active memory and future reinforcement because of limits on
organizational control, lack of legitimacy of a practice, personnel turnover, different
types of distance within the organizational boundary, rate of learning, etc.
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Over the last several decades, a considerable body of research has suggested that
organizational learning based on prior experience drives important future strategic actions
(March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963, Nelson and Winter, 1982). At the core
of this argument is the assumption that firms may be able to improve their future
behavior relying on the experience, outcomes, and feedback received from past actions
(Cyert and March, 1963; Miller and Friesen, 1980). The nature and scope of their
experiences enables firms to improve routine-based learning and enhances the likelihood
of the routine/learning being used in future relevant activities. Given that organizational
learning and feedback are a crucial part of firms’ future strategic behaviors, we consider
the strategic performance implications for similar corporate actions.
The view that learning stems from feedback, grounded in the Carnegie school of
thought (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963), emphasizes the role of organizational outcomes
from prior actions and suggests that these outcomes determine a firm’s future behavior
(Greve, 2003). Some theoretical work in the learning tradition has implied that routines
and feedback work together to shape and reinforce firms’ future behavior (Levitt and
March, 1988). Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan (2006) have examined the combined
effect of routines and feedback based on prior acquisition experience, in the context of
the US commercial banking industry. Building on these notions of routines and feedback
from previous organizational actions, this study seeks to demonstrate that an alliance
partner’s likelihood of a future acquisition of its partner is positively related to the nature
of alliance experience with the target firm immediately prior to the acquisition.

9

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Considering the nature and focus of our research questions, we formulate the
following five hypotheses. The relationships proposed in these hypotheses are illustrated
in the following conceptual model (Figure 2):

Role of Deal Characteristics in Building Relational Mechanisms
According to the seminal piece of Levitt and March (1988), even within a
consistent and accepted set of routines for actions and practices, only part of an
organization’s memory is likely to be evoked for its future application. In this case, the
recency of a certain organizational experience is very critical. Therefore, we build on this
premise that in the context of a post-alliance acquisition attempt, the most valuable
aspects of experience an acquiring firm can gain are from its partnering experience with
the target firm. Assuming that there is a connection between the alliance deal and postalliance strategic actions of a firm with its alliance partner, we propose that positive or
negative dynamics of inter-organizational experience and reciprocity would further
signify the future outcome of a partnership. We believe that the following steps
summarize this relational mechanism. First, alliance deals provide a focal firm with the
opportunity to receive partner-specific learning, feedback, and to build partner-specific
routines. Second, when a focal firm’s post alliance experience/exchanges with its partner
are satisfactory, it validates the focal firm’s assumptions that they have developed a
certain level of competencies required to successfully work together (Haleblian, Kim, and
Rajagopalan, 2006). Finally, it elevates the confidence of a focal firm’s decision-makers
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to undertake a post-alliance acquisition attempt based on both the performance feedback
and partner specific experience from the alliance deal.
Alliances and acquisitions being complex events, the causal relationship between
performance and the factors contributing to the performance may not very be clear
(Sirower, 1997). Therefore, learning from the performance feedback from an alliance
requires a focal firm to carry out a meaningful evaluation of the performance (Haleblian,
Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006), beyond merely the financial measure of performance. Such
an evaluation may appear to be a difficult task when varying performance levels of
multiple activities may demand time and cognitive effort from the decision makers.
Therefore, we argue that different transaction- and relation-specific factors become
important to decision-makers as they consider post-alliance strategic choices. Behavioral
theorists have suggested that under such ambiguous conditions, decision makers tend to
rely on the most recent information to reduce their cognitive burdens and simplify
information processing (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Steiner & Rain, 1989). Following
these lines of reasoning, we believe that partner-specific and dyadic conditions of the
most recent alliance deal are likely to result in a positive or negative evaluation of an
interfirm relationship. In other words, reciprocity, mutuality, and emerging dynamics of
an inter-organizational relationship would play the role of a precursor to the success of a
higher level of post-partnership resource commitment. Accordingly, in the following
sections we identify a number of deal specific and relational characteristics supported by
the extant literature that are central to studying this collective phenomenon of alliances
leading to acquisitions.
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Prior Partnership between Firms
Some scholars suggested that at the individual firm level, a firm’s experience with
various prior partners contributes to its relational capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998;
Gulati, 1999, 2007; Kale et al., 2002; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). Such experience
contributes to the development of alliance management routines that assist firms in
partner selection, the choice of appropriate governance mechanisms, and the effective
management of inter-organizational relationships. These relational capabilities, in turn,
are likely to enhance value creation in subsequent alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000).
Firm dyads with repeated transactions develop relational absorptive capacity
(Wang and Zajac, 2007). Experience in each inter-organizational deal is important to the
creation of routines and capabilities, because each successive deal carries intrinsic value,
creates experience, generates feedback, and provides information about a potential target
firm’s capabilities (Arikan and McGahan, 2010). These inter-organizational mechanisms
typically precede partners’ investments in relation specific assets and knowledge-sharing
routines as well as reliance on complementary resources and trust-based governance
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). The emergence of such relational mechanisms depends on the
interactions with partners (Gulati and Sytch, 2007, 2008; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone,
1998), and thus is tied to the history of prior relationships with specific partners.
Consequently, benefits that can derive from partnering experience are less fungible across
alliances with other partners (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). For instance, inter-firm
trust with a given partner does not imply trust of another partner; knowledge sharing
routines that economize on transaction costs with a certain partner may not be applicable
in relationships with other partners; and mutually agreed upon conflict resolution
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mechanisms that are applied in recurrent alliances with the same partner are not
necessarily applicable in all other alliances (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). Therefore,
multiple types of experience benefits are available only in recurrent alliances with the
same partners.
Prior studies suggested that at the dyadic level, the partnering experience of two
firms may reduce opportunistic behavior in subsequent alliances between them by
guiding partner selection decisions and by fostering mutual trust, reciprocity, informal
obligation, and loyalty (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Wang, 2003; Kogut, 1989; Park and
Kim, 1997). Consequently, partners are more willing to commit critical resources (Dyer
and Singh, 1998; Zajac and Olsen, 1993) and cut back on the control and monitoring
costs in such recurrent alliances (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Williamson, 1985). Experience
accumulated in recurrent alliances with the same partners also contributes to the capacity
of partners to resolve inter-firm conflicts (Kale et al., 2000; Simonin, 1997), reduces
transactional uncertainties, and enhances the predictability of alliance success. The above
discussion altogether enables us to deduce that alliance deals are generally more
satisfactory to partnering firms when agreements involve recurrent partnerships, which
may invoke the intent in the partners to pool resources for greater integration through a
majority-share acquisition. Given the previous lines of reasoning, we expect that prior
alliance experience with a partner will have a positive effect on the likelihood of a future
acquisition attempt. Thus, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Prior partnership agreement between a dyad of alliance partners
would increase the likelihood of a post-alliance acquisition attempt between the same
partners.
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Multi-nationality
In inter-organizational relationships between firms from different countries, the
dyad of the firms typically face higher levels of geographic, economic, cultural, psychic,
administrative and political distance (also collectively referred to as institutional distance)
vis-à-vis a uni-national setting (Verbeke, 2010). A very widely accepted body of research
building on the contributions of North (1990), Scott (1995), Kostova (1999), and Peng
(2008) theorize on the complexities created by institutional differences that underlie
cross-border strategic alliance (Phene and Tallman, 2012; Tallman and Phene, 2007;
Gulati and Singh, 1998) or merger & acquisition settings (Dikova, Sahib, and
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Meyer and Altenborg, 2008; Wang and Zajac, 2007, Morosini,
Shane, Singh, 1998). In view of the literature, we argue that creation of relational
mechanism in a dyadic context takes substantial effort on the part of partnering firms and
imposes further costs on their exchange process. An alliance with a partner from the same
national context (even after recognizing sub-national differences) provides firms with a
more stable and consistent learning context. In such a context, experience is accumulated
more efficiently, resulting in lower learning costs, and exhibiting faster learning
compared to an unfamiliar environment where communication and collaboration takes
greater effort (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009).
It is also believed that home country differences in a relationship dyad may
become more complex than micro-level differences (e.g., differences in organizational
culture) (Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh, 1996). These differences may entail issues ranging
from problems with “evaluating information on research output and productivity,
calculating hypothetical synergies and formulating optimistic business plans based on
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increased innovation capacity, towards actually trying to make the acquisition [an interfirm collaboration] work by bundling assets and capabilities in practice” (Verbeke, 2010:
41). These distance components that are embedded in national differences between the
host countries of firms, therefore, may deteriorate inter-firm exchanges and complicate
the process of building common routines and relational capabilities in an alliance.
Furthermore, higher institutional distance underlying national difference makes it more
difficult for partnering firms to achieve optimal commonality in their dominant logics (A
dominant logic reflects “[firms’] entrenched habitual modes of functioning based on prior
successes and failures and the strategic contingencies they have had to face in the past”
(Cote, Langley, and Pasquero, 1999). However, efficient and effective integration of an
acquired company with its acquirer usually requires the latter to institutionalize at least
some of its routines in a post-acquisition integration (Verbeke, 2010; Verbeke and
Kenworthy, 2008).
Given such an institutionally challenging scenario of inter-firm exchange,
managers of a focal firm are likely to have a negative evaluation of a successful postacquisition success with a partner in such a strategic alliance, and to not consider a postalliance acquisition. As a result, we anticipate that national and regional differences
between partner firms may reduce a focal firm’s motivation to go for a deeper level of
integration with its partner:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Differences in national origin (i.e., a cross-border deal) of alliance
partner firm dyads will decrease the likelihood of their post-alliance acquisition attempt.
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Ownership Type Difference
Increasingly global, dynamic, and competitive environments have encouraged
firms to rely on external sources for supplementary and complementary resources and
capabilities (Santoro and Chakrabarti, 2002). As a result, interfirm relationships are being
formed between and among various types of large multidivisional, subsidiaries, public,
private, and not-for-profit organizations. But, these different types of organizational
ownership forms are distinct from one another due to their diverse pools of resources,
knowledge, capabilities, ownership, management, and governance structures (Harrison et
al., 2001).
Evidently therefore, partnering with organizations of different governance
structures and purposes would pose a greater challenge for partnering firms in terms of
resources and knowledge sharing, effective and efficient communication, development of
organizational routines, and so on. For instance, publicly owned companies, more so than
privately owned ones, are expected to comply with a variety of national and international
regulations. At a broader level, dissimilar organizations in terms of ownership variety are
likely to have different goals, decision-making processes, and organizational systems that
may cause communication and coordination difficulties in inter-organizational settings,
resulting in increased transaction costs. It may even cause reduction in overall value
creation potential from an alliance deal and create issues with post-alliance integration
(Jiang, Tao, and Santoro, 2010). Wang and Zajac (2007) found that considering the
potential for synergy creation, more similar firms may prefer acquisitions over alliances
due to greater value-creation opportunities. They further argued that similar firms that
have greater duplication in routines and resources may be able to eliminate many
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redundancies by pooling their resources together. As a result, the combined firm, i.e., an
acquisition, is likely to be more efficient (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dussauge, Garrette, and
Mitchell, 2000). Moreover, when two firms are similar, organizational operations and
transactions are more efficient within the boundary of a firm vis-à-vis in an interorganizational relationship, which is suggestive of greater realization of synergies
(Garrette and Dussauge, 2000).
As a result, we argue that an alliance deal involving parties of different ownership
structures reduces the potential for a higher partnership satisfaction between the partners,
and may complicate the routine and capability development process, ceteris paribus. The
difficulties in mutuality and reciprocity during the duration of an alliance are likely to
have a negative effect on the confidence of decision makers as to whether a greater level
of integration and commitment could be more beneficial in the form of an acquisition –
especially given a more legally binding context of an acquisition deal. Therefore, we
predict the following effect stemming from the difference in partnering firms’ ownership
types:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Difference in the organizational ownership types (e.g., public,
private, or subsidiary) between partner firms involved in a strategic alliance would
decrease the likelihood of their post-alliance acquisition attempt.
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Intangibility
Sharing and/or pooling resources (namely, financial assets, brand reputation,
knowledge, capabilities) and exchange of them are very fundamental to strategic alliance
deals. Several studies (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1999;
Rothaermel, 2001; Van De Ven and Walker, 1984) used resource dependence theory
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959;
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986 and 1991) to investigate the important of resources in the
context of strategic alliances. From a resource-based perspective, equity investments,
including majority share acquisitions, offer preferential access to complementary
resources of partnering firms that are sought in alliances (Colombo, Grilli, and Piva,
2006). From the perspective of the knowledge-based view, alliances provide partners
with an opportunity to access and combine knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).
For that matter, many alliances are formed for purposes of new product development
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), knowledge production (Kale and Singh, 2007) or creation
of new capabilities (Colombo, 2003), which require the transfer and recombination of
existing knowledge (Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). According to Grant and BadenFuller (2004), these “knowledge accessing” inter-firm alliances involve cooperative
relationships that are not fully defined either by formal contracts or by ownership. In
terms of Williamsonian transaction cost economics, these inter-organizational forms fall
between the polar extremes of markets and hierarchies, making these cooperative
relationships “intermediate” organizational forms (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Powell,
1987; Thorelli, 1986) that are open to evolution. According to complementary
perspectives (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003) that integrate the resource-based and the
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knowledge-based views of the firm, the role of coordination in governance mode
decisions play a critical role in the projection of other organizational forms.
Tangible characteristics (e.g., financial indicators, tangible resources, such as cash
or cash equivalents) of an alliance deal enable partnering firms to realize whether they
would be able to create new value from an alliance if they were to attempt an acquisition.
In this particular hypothesis, we argue that that alliance outcomes would vary depending
on the intangible forms of resources (e.g., knowledge) underlying an inter-firm exchange.
When an alliance involves a knowledge-based firm, research and development (R&D)
agreement, or a technology-based participant, the intangibility elements of the interorganizational relationship may hinder a focal firm’s accurate evaluation of a partnering
firm’s value. This is likely to blur a partner’s post-alliance intent to attempt a subsequent
acquisition. This reasoning stems from the following sources: a) Technology-based
alliances frequently result in competitive learning, i.e., gaining greater power relative to
the partner. This increases the likelihood of a partner to walk away from a deal, reducing
the likelihood of alliance survival or a greater level of commitment through a subsequent
M&A (Parkhe, 1993; Yan, 1998); b) Due to the intangibility attribute of resources
possessed by knowledge-based firms, the value of their resources and capabilities (with
the exception of radical innovation or certain patents) are not easily quantified or
assessed by a partnering or acquiring firm (Arend, 2004). This hinders a firm’s ability to
foresee the level of synergy that could potentially be achieved through further
resource/knowledge pooling through a majority-equity acquisition. Therefore, we argue
that knowledge, R&D partnership, and technological characteristics of an alliance deal
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impair the abilities of focal firms to effectively evaluate the true future potential for their
alliance partners.
Furthermore, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) opined that relative absorptive capacity in
a partnership depends on specific attributes of alliances, such as, the relatedness of
partners’ knowledge. Absorptive capacity of firms, which is defined by Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) as a firm’s "ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate
it, and apply it to commercial ends", is an important prerequisite for value creation in
inter-organizational relationships. Some studies suggest that performance benefits tend to
accumulate more readily to firms that have low to medium knowledge difference and
firm that are capable of accessing knowledge between organizations (Inkpen and Tsang,
2005; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).
Szulanski (1996) pointed out that knowledge is sticky for a variety of individual
and organizational conditions and despite organizational efforts, it does not move easily
in an inter-divisional or inter-firm context. One of the key findings in the area of
knowledge management is that integration of knowledge within or between firms is a
very complex phenomenon (Grant, 1996; Almeida and Phene, 2004; Phene and Almeida
2008). The above discussions suggest that the elements of intangibility in an alliance
deal may negatively affect the inter-firm relationship, and thus reduce further future
resource commitments between one another.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): When an alliance agreement involves transfer of intangible
resources and/or capabilities, or partnership between knowledge or technology based
firms, the likelihood of a post-alliance acquisition attempt would be reduced.
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METHODOLOGY
In addition to the detailed description of the sample, data sources, variables, and
measures used to empirically test the hypotheses for the study, the following section
provides a quick snapshot of these important aspects of our research methods:
Sample and Data Sources
Data on alliance and mergers & acquisitions (M&A) announcements are extracted
for the years 1990–2012. The initial sample, consisting of all the entries of alliances and
M&As, is compiled from Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database’s M&A
and joint-venture modules. We started by extracting data on all the alliance deal
announcements during 1991–2010 and M&A announcements during 1991–2012. Given
our outcome variable, we took into consideration all the acquisitions there were publicly
announced (i.e., an acquirer made an actual attempt at purchasing a target) within that
time period, regardless of whether they were completed or abandoned at a later time.
Although some acquisition attempts do not realize after months and years of negotiation,
the public announcement of an acquisition attempt is considered an important indicator of
an acquirer’s interest in a target firm (Dikova, Sahib, and Witteloostuijn, 2010). Next, we
excluded the partnerships that involved government agencies and/or not-for-profit
organizations, since post-alliance acquisitions in these alliances may not be a viable
option on regulatory grounds. Then, for each deal we determined whether the acquirer
and target had partnered to form an alliance at any point before the acquisition
announcement. Finally, we augmented our dataset, by extracting financial variables from
the Compustat database.
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Measures
Dependent Variable
Acquisition Attempt: Since we are interested in partnering firms’ post-alliance
acquisition behavior, the dependent variable of the study is a dichotomous categorical
variable denoting a specific type of post-alliance strategic action, which is whether a firm
attempted a majority share (50.1%) acquisition or not after forming an alliance with the
same partner. All the other non-equity or equity based JVs are coded as alliance. This
variable, therefore takes the value of 1 if a firm, previously engaged in an alliance
agreement made a public announcement of an acquisition attempt (i.e., regardless of
whether it was completed or abandoned) to acquire a partnering firm, and 0 otherwise.
We followed the operationalization followed by Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee (2010)
to determine an acquisition.
Explanatory Variables
Prior partnership (H1): This is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if
the alliance deal involves two firms that had prior partnering agreements with one
another (i.e., besides the only one that resulted in an acquisition attempt) in any previous
year in the entire dataset, and 0 otherwise. We created this variable following several
studies that measured this construct (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009; Zollo, Reuer, and
Singh, 2002; Gulati, 1995). To operationalize this variable, we created a new variable for
recurrent partnerships by searching the entire dataset for previous alliances between the
same firms.
Multi-nationality (H2): this is also a dichotomous variable. It is counted as 1 if
the alliance deal involves two firms from the different countries and 0 if the firms are
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from the same country as coded by alliance nation code in SDC Platinum database. We
followed Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee (2010) to operationalize this variable.
Ownership Type Difference (H3): This dichotomous variable captures the
difference in the ownership/governance structure of the partnering firms in question.
However, partnerships involving not-for-profit firms and government agencies are
excluded from our sample given that even when the communication or coordination is
favorable with a government agency or non-profit seeking organizations, acquisition is
not an option. This variable therefore is counted as 0 when alliance partners involve firms
with the same organizational type (public-public, private-private, etc.), and 1 if the deal
engages more than one organizational ownership type (public-private, private-subsidiary,
and so on). This variable is consistent with the measure used by Jiang, Tao, and Santoro
(2010).
Intangibility (H4): This variable measures the elements of intangibility or
tacitness involved in an alliance deal. This is also a dichotomous variable that takes the
value of 1 if the alliance deal involves transfer of technology, an R&D partnership, or if
at least one of the allying firms operate in a technology-based industry, and otherwise 0.
Control Variables
We used several control variables that are found by previous studies to be
correlated with acquisition attempts. Following is a description of these variables:
Acquisition Experience (CV1): We controlled for the effect of prior organizational
learning of the acquiring firms. It is measured in terms of acquisition experience by
counting the number of prior M&A deals completed by the focal firm within 4 years prior
to the focal deal (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006). To capture this variable, we
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code a deal as a focal one when a prior alliance between two companies results in an
acquisition attempt (which is our dependent variable). In this case the focal firm is the
one that makes an acquisition attempt (or the acquirer).
Alliance Experience (CV2): Consistent with Gulati et al. (2009), we count the
number of prior alliance deals formed by the focal firm within 4 years prior to the focal
deal and follow the same calculation method that we did for acquisition experience to
operationalize alliance experience to create this variable. The only exception is that we
apply the formula to count the number of alliance deals undertaken by a focal firm,
instead of number of acquisitions. This way we use a proxy for an acquirer’s
organizational learning in alliance activities by capturing the number of prior alliance
deals.
Number of Alliance Partners in a Deal (CV3): Prior research suggests that the
number of alliance partners, especially when more than two partners are involved in an
alliance, are likely to complicate the interactions of the parties in a deal. Therefore, we
control for this effect. We coded this variable 1 for alliances involving two participants,
and for any other number of alliance partners in a deal, we coded 0.
Acquirer’s Public Status (CV4): This variable captures whether the partnering
firms are publicly owned/traded. Publicly owned companies, more so than privately
owned ones, must comply with national and international regulations throughout all
phases of trading activities (Dikova, et al., 2010). This feature of publicly owned
companies may cause delays in the completion of an acquisition deal or a focal firm’s
motivation to acquire a publicly held target (Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin, 2004).
“Public” status of the participants was coded 1, 0 otherwise.
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Target Attractiveness (CV5): A highly attractive target is likely to receive more
attention from potential acquirers if they are financially better performing firm. To proxy
for a firm’s attractiveness as a target for acquisition, we gauge its financial strength in
terms of Return on Equity (ROE). The higher the value for this measure, the higher a
firm’s attractiveness as a target.
Finally, we used binary variables to control for year-specific variations.
Statistical Technique
Hypotheses of this study predicted the likelihood of post-alliance acquisition
given a number of explanatory variables. The dependent variable of the hypotheses is a
binary variable. Given the dichotomous nature of these dependent variables, use of a
logistics regression (logit) is appropriate (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981; Greene, 1997;
Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). A logit model captures that the probabilities will be
within the (0, 1) range. The statistical analyses for logit models are based on binomial
distribution and have several advantages, including: a) there is no need for explanatory
variables and dependent variable to be normally distributed, b) the model can handle
nonlinear effects, and c) it allows for explanatory variables to be categorical (Menard,
2001).
We estimated the logit model using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure
that presents outputs in parameter estimates that are consistent and asymptotically
efficient for large samples. To test the significance of the entire logit model, we used the
model log likelihood chi-square, which is analogous to the multivariate F-test in linear
regression testing the null hypothesis where all coefficients are zero. The parameters
(logits) estimated are the natural log of the odds ratio and are interpreted in the following
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manner: a positive (negative) logit means that the odds that the binary dependent variable
equals 1 increase (decrease) when the independent variable increases (decreases). In other
words, a positive coefficient designates a positive association and a negative coefficient
designates a negative association. In addition, because we have panel data (i.e., multiple
dimensions, years, and observations per firm that may not be independent), we use
STATA’s ‘xtlogit’ command with fixed effects that group observations based on firm
identification.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 and 2 provide the bivariate correlation matrix and descriptive statistics
(i.e., mean and standard deviations) for our measures. A glance at the correlation matrix
reveals that there are no significantly high correlations that could confound results due to
multicollinearity that lead to variance inflation. The results showed that among the
predictor variables, including the control variables, the variance inflation factor (VIF) did
not exceed the suggested cutoff limit of 10 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Netter, 2004;
Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller, 1988). More specifically, all of these VIF estimates
were below 8. Therefore, the assumption for the existence of no significant threat of
multicollinearity was met.

Table 3 presents the logistic regression results we used to test hypotheses 1-5. The
hypotheses examine the proposed relationships between post-alliance acquisition attempt
and various deal and partnership related variables. This table first introduces the control
variables to create a baseline model against which to compare our subsequent hypothesis
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tests. The direct effect variables, namely prior partnership, multi-nationality,
organizational ownership type difference, and intangibility elements of the deal are
introduced in the subsequent models along with the control variables.

Model I in Table 3 is the baseline model introducing only the control variables.
Model 1 tests the first hypothesis regarding prior partnership. The first hypothesis
expected a positive relationship between prior partnership between alliance partners and
the likelihood of a subsequent acquisition. Model II tests H1 and finds strong support for
the hypothesized relationship in H1 (p<0.01) in the opposite direction than what we
anticipated.
Based on the logic of institutional difference embedded in international business,
we anticipated negative implications of national difference in partners’ relational
exchange in an alliance setting and its possible bearing on partners’ post-alliance strategic
action. The results of this relationship are represented by Model III. The model suggests
strong significant support for H2 (p<0.01), fully consistent with our arguments that
national difference between the partners engaged in an alliance deal is likely to reduce the
possibility of a post-alliance acquisition attempt.
Our third hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between the difference in
organizational ownership type and a post-alliance acquisition attempt. Prior literature
suggested that difference of organizational structure and purposes may impose greater
complexities in the process of relational exchanges in an alliance deal. This hypothesis
H3, tested by Model IV, was also found to be strongly significant (p<0. 01) in the
predicted direction as to a negative association. The data suggests difference of
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organizational ownership type undermines a focal firm’s desire to acquire its current
alliance partner.
Consistent with our prediction, H4 was strongly supported (p<0.01), suggesting a
negative association between the existence of intangibility elements in an alliance deal
and post-alliance acquisition attempt. This hypothesis was based on the challenges of
relational exchanges in inter-organizational contexts that are rooted in knowledge-based
theory of the firm. Model V in table 3 tests this relationship. With a significant and
negative coefficient (p<0.01), our analysis suggests that H4 was also strongly supported.
The overall results of our analyses generally confirm our overarching theoretical
arguments. Specifically, the results offer support for our hypotheses regarding the
likelihood of relational and deal specific characteristics, namely, national difference (H2),
ownership type difference (H3), and intangibility elements (H4). These empirical
findings indicate that certain relational mechanisms are shaped by the dyadic and/or deal
characteristics of the alliance deals, and may influence firms to make a post-alliance
acquisition attempt when the setting of a prior alliance is favorable for the partners to
have mutually satisfactory partnering experience.
Support for H2, H3, and H4 indicate the importance of dyadic and deal-specific
characteristics that have strategic implications for future target selection. Three such sets
of assumptions contribute to these relational dynamics:
a) Increased barriers to inter-firm communication, co-ordination, conflict
resolution, increased learning and routine-development costs between alliance
partners influence the relational mechanism as evidenced by a potential
acquirer’s perception of a future target’s attractiveness.
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b) Multi-national setting, organizational type difference, and intangibility
involved in an alliance deal lead to difficulties in developing a stable and
consistent relational experience in the inter-organizational exchange process,
which as a result make a potential target less attractive.
c) Prior partnering experience contributes to relational capability development to
encourage a future governance change (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1999,
2007; Kale et al., 2002; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) especially in terms of
further control and resource commitment through acquisition.
H1 tested by Model II that sought for a relationship between recurrent partnership
between an acquirer and a target firm and the likelihood of post-alliance acquisition was
not supported. However, we found it to be strongly significant in the opposite direction,
i.e., a negative coefficient, in respect to what we anticipated. This suggests that when
partners are involved in more than one alliance deals with each other, the likelihood of an
acquisition attempt will decrease. In other words, partners are less likely to engage in a
post-alliance acquisition when they have had multiple partnership deals with the same
partner in the past. This is quite contrary to the prior findings in strategic alliance
research (Gulati and Sytch, 2007, 2008; Wang and Zajac, 2007; Zaheer, McEvily, and
Perrone, 1998). One possible explanation may be that where partners are already
enjoying specific transaction, strategic, and financial benefits emanating from partnerspecific experience (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009), they are less likely to take a
alternate action that may threaten the trust and mutuality underlying the status quo. Given
the multiplicity of alliance agreements between the partners, the partner-specific
dependency rises. Thus, partners may become less motivated to change the governance
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structure from a relatively hands-off relationship to a dominant or controlling role by
making an acquisition.
LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Overall, this study attempts to contribute to corporate development activities
literature by synthesizing findings of both alliance and M&A research streams. While this
study represents an important step towards understanding the factors relating to a focal
firm’s post-alliance M&A strategy, a few aspects of our research model could complicate
our conclusions, if they are not considered with caution. First, since we focus on
announced deals based on publicly available data, we are unable to evaluate how the
managerial decision-making process may influence a post-alliance acquisition attempt. In
other words we make an assumption that the short and long period of inter-organizational
relationships and/or actions influence a firm’s future strategic actions. Hence we make
the assumption that the dyadic nature of partnership-specific characteristics and
exchanges in an alliance deal that are beyond a focal firm’s immediate control play an
important role in predicting a focal firm’s post-alliance acquisition attempt. Future casebased and survey-based research may seek to examine whether these managerial factors
play a role in post-alliance acquisition decisions. Second, our empirical results may be
somewhat limited by methods or practices used in the data collection of the data sources.
Despite our sincere attempts to maximize the data points for this study, given the
reporting standards and availability of data in SDC Platinum database we had to exclude
several of the alliance and acquisition deals. However, it was no exception to many other
rigorous studies that used the same data source, including the ones published in leading
strategy journals.
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Given the emerging body of research in this cross-form inter-organizational
context, future survey-based or qualitative studies may be conducted to examine the
accumulated alliance experience of both acquiring and target firms for post-alliance
acquisition strategies. Such research may also confirm whether the observed effects of
relational mechanisms hold true for other modes of alliances, in populations of smaller
firms, or firms from developing and/or emerging economies. However, it is also
important to realize the challenge of data-collection on alliances that involve less formal
arrangements and in cross-cultural contexts, especially when the archival data sources are
inadequate.

CONTRIBUTION
Previous studies have made substantial progress in understanding various sets of
firm, industry, contextual, and relational characteristics that determine the choice
between/among alternative governance structures, i.e., different forms alliances, mergers
& acquisitions, partner selection in alliances and acquisitions. However, this study
focused on understanding a cross-form choice between alliances and acquisitions, which
required synthesis of two parallel streams of research. The objective was to understand
whether dyadic exchange in an alliance may positively or negatively associate with the
likelihood of post alliance acquisition. Despite some limitations, we believe, this study
informs strategy researchers and practitioners with important insights about inter-firm
relationship mechanisms. The broader implication of the study, evidently, is taking an
integrative approach to understanding interdependency of experience and learning across
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various types of corporate development activities (i.e., multi-task setting). Specific
contributes of this study include:


Identifying several important deal/dyadic characteristics, e.g., multi-national
context, organizational type difference, and intangibility which are found to
undermine the relational dynamics of an inter-organizational experience and have
implications for future strategic outcomes.



Explaining the process how the relational mechanisms of an alliance lead to very
important decision making at the corporate level phenomenon of future target
selection for acquiring firms.



Extending strategy literature by highlighting the relevance of path-dependent and
cross-form nature of organizational learning for inter-organizational strategies.
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STUDY II:
DOES PRIOR ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE OF AN ACQUIRER SPILL OVER TO ITS
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE?

INTRODUCTION
In their work on the myopia of learning, March and Levinthal (1993) described the
hazards of increasing specialization in a particular domain of learning. The assumption is that
the knowledge and experience gained in one organizational activity can hinder learning in
another activity, implying a potential for negative experience spillover effects. In contrast,
Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) theory of absorptive capacity recognizes a multitask perspective
of learning. They suggested that firms, having developed substantial knowledge in a certain
domain, may become more skilled at expanding the span of their competence into excelling in
related contexts, which acknowledges positive learning effects across organizational activities.
In view of the vast literature in organizational learning and given the recent scholarly
contributions, it is evident that the performance outcomes of organizational learning across
various corporate development activities remains as an area open for further research. The
framework for learning spillover, therefore, is of inherent interest to strategy scholars and
practitioners alike, not only because of their managerial relevance, but also because there
appears to be intriguing inconsistencies to explain the processes that are not evident in more
traditional, single-task learning models (Zollo and Reuer, 2010).
A number of recent studies implied that there might be experience spillover effects or
interdependency of learning between strategic alliance and acquisition activities at the dyadic
(i.e., partner-specific) level (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee,
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2010; Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz, and Croson, 2012). Each of these handful of papers
considered research questions that explain this experience spillover effect from a dyadic level
of partner-specific learning. However, in this study we are guided by the following broad
questions: Does alliance experience, e.g., organizational memory, routines, and their recency
at the program level (i.e., beyond just partner-specific learning) of a focal firm’s alliancespecific learning have any transfer effects across its corporate development activities through
acquisitions? This central question leads us to ponder additional questions: Which aspects of
alliance-based learning can potentially explain the focal acquirer’s acquisition performance?
Even more specifically, we are interested in examining whether frequency, recency, and
relatedness of different dimensions of prior alliances of an acquirer, beyond the dyad-level
experience, relate to superior acquisition performance. To explain this phenomenon, we rely
on the concepts of procedural, declarative, and transactive memory previously used by
organizational learning scholars.

THEORETICAL BACKDROP: TRANSFER OF LEARNING IN A MULTI-TASK
SETTING
In this section, we trace the building blocks of organizational learning in a multi-task
setting highlighting the contributions of cognitive psychologists and researchers of
organizational learning:
Experience as a Source of Organizational Memory
Not all organizational experience and learning are equally or universally useful.
Cognitive psychologists have long established that the context, elements, and
organization of knowledge are critical to the directionality (vertical or lateral) of the
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transfer of learning (Thorndike, 1901, 1903; Gagne, 1966; Tversky, 1977). Furthermore,
organizational learning scholars have long opined that since experience becomes less
useful over time, the benefits of prior experience may not increase monotonically with
the amount of experience that a firm accumulates (Argote, 1999; Barnett, Greve, and
Park, 1994; Hayward, 2002). This suggests that the timing of learning is critical. For
instance, environmental changes (e.g., change in regulations, industry standards) may
lead routines, procedures, and contexts to become less relevant to obsolete. For example,
Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan (2006) suggested that certain regulatory changes in the
banking industry forced banks to review their existing acquisition strategies, to modify
their templates for making acquisitions, and to search for new practices. Because those
regulatory changes marked significant shifts in the industry, a bank’s acquisition
experience before the changes might not represent viable repositories for future learning.
Such experience might even lead firms to adopt outdated routines and undermine their
performance by replicating strategies that worked well under different circumstances
(Barney and Hesterley, 1996).
Organizational Routines as Elements of Learning
Organizational routines are believed to be the repository of organizational
capabilities (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Research on routines as repositories of organizational capabilities (Dosi, Nelson, and
Winter, 2000; Winter 2000, 2003; Zollo and Winter, 2002) has emphasized that
organizational routines do not just preserve the past, but, being a repository of
organizational capabilities, they also shape how deliberate learning occurs inside firms,
thereby paving the way for the future development of the firm (Winter, 2000; Zollo and
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Winter, 2002). It is believed that strategic decisions are influenced by routines, i.e.,
repetitive patterns of activity and capabilities, that develop from organizational
experience (Nelson and Winter, 1982). A considerable body of research established that
routines are those elements of organizational memory that drive important organizational
actions and serve as the repository of organizational capabilities (March and Simon,
1958; Cyert and March, 1963, Nelson and Winter, 1982). Additionally, greater
experience with a particular type of repetitive behavior provides a platform for firms to
build and refine routines, and enhances the likelihood of the routine being used further
yielding superior organizational outcomes. Given that routines are a crucial part of how
firms accomplish their tasks, in this section, we state the relevance of organizational
experience as it relates to the transfer of learning from a focal firm’s alliance activities to
acquisition performance.
Context of Experience and Learning
The literature on learning in the context of alliances covered several types of
experience: general collaborative experience, industry-specific alliance experience (e.g.,
technology-based deals), and partner-specific alliance experience (Gulati, Lavie, Singh, 2009;
Reuer, Zollo, Singh, 2002). General collaborative experience refers to a focal firm’s overall
alliance experience in the previous years. Industry-specific alliance experience includes a focal
firm’s experience in only those alliances with other firms (i.e., partners) from a particular
industry. Finally, partner-specific alliance experience entails a focal firm’s learning with a
specific partner at a dyadic level. The empirical evidence as to which of these types of
experience leads to superior collaborative performance has been largely inconclusive (Gulati,
Lavie, and Singh, 2009; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998).
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Alliance Experience Spill-Over to Acquisition
Organizations learn from prior experience, and this learning is transferrable to
accomplishing the same or related tasks in different contexts. One of the studies that
contributed to understanding organizational learning in a multi-task setting was
conducted by Zollo and Reuer (2010). They examined how, at a dyadic level of interorganizational partnership, organizational experience accumulated between partnering
firms may influence the performance of another as the nature of the partnership changes.
A valuable contribution of this study involves developing and testing a contingent theory
of learning across organizational activities as alliance partners decide to pursue a deeper
level of integration through acquisition. To understand the transfer of learning from the
task of alliances to acquisitions, this study theorized that partner-specific alliance
experience of a firm would be beneficial to the performance of the focal acquisition when
an acquisition is managed in ways that resemble the typical handling of its alliances.
However, when acquisitions are managed with more aggressive post-acquisition
management approaches, the benefits of alliance experience can cease to work and can
even adversely affect the acquisition performance.
Another recent study (Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banarjee, 2010) that integrated
alliance activities and acquisition performance drew on the concept of absorptive
capacity (Dyer and Singh 1998) as a pre-condition for weakening both pre- and postacquisition information asymmetry to understanding acquisition performance. This study,
also at the dyadic level of partnership, postulated that partner-specific absorptive capacity
is enhanced through prior alliance experience with targets and is particularly useful in
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ameliorating information asymmetry both in international acquisitions and knowledgeintensive acquisitions.
Yet another study by Agarwal et al. (2012) applied insights from organization
design, economic game theory, and social psychology to emphasize the importance of
prior resource allocation and communication in reducing behavioral uncertainty that
arises in inter-unit coordination settings within and across organizations. This study’s
focus was to examine the extent to which routines created under one inter-organizational
form (i.e., strategic alliances) at a dyadic level of relationship may be successfully
transferred to another inter-organizational architecture (i.e., acquisition of a couple of
alliance partners). This study particularly emphasized the importance of developing interorganizational social processes and norms for superior acquisition performance.
From a theoretical standpoint, previous studies have proposed that pre-acquisition
alliance activities may enhance performance in an acquisition (Haspeslagh and Jemison,
1991; Kogut, 1991; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Hagedoorn
and Sadowski, 1999; Porrini, 2004). However, the empirical evidence, thus far, is unable
to provide a conclusive answer to the question as to which aspects of alliance experience
contribute to performance differences. For instance, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006)
reported a positive association between prior alliances on market reaction to acquisition
announcements examining 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions, of which 28 percent had
prior alliances. Whereas Zaheer et al. (2010) found no main effects of prior alliances
between partners on their post-acquisition performance. Therefore, to extend our
understanding based on this growing body of literature, we attempt to advance our theory
beyond the dyadic view of experience spillover. More specifically, we examine the
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implications of organizational memory, routines, and relevance of learning from a focal
acquirer’s recent alliance experience in various contexts and with others firms to examine
performance in this multi-task setting of transfer of learning.

It is apparent that researchers, to date, have mostly been interested in explaining
benefits for organizational learning in alliances and acquisitions at the dyadic level of
partnership. However, given the overall progress made by researchers at the program
level of organizational learning, though separately in alliance and acquisition literature, in
this study, we extend this literature of performance implications of transfer effects to the
overall corporate and alliance & acquisition program level (as opposed to partner-specific
learning) by integrating both of these streams of literature. Building on cognitive
psychologists’ assumptions, we argue that an organization’s recent memory,
commonality of elements, routines, and the context of learning in alliances may
positively relate to enhanced performance in acquisitions.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Building on the above theoretical background, we theorize on developing the
following hypotheses. An illustration of these hypothesized relationships is presented in the
conceptual model of the study (Figure 3 - Study II):
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Acquirer’s Alliance Experience and Acquisition Performance
Previous studies have widely speculated that post-acquisition performance may be
improved by pre-acquisition alliance activity (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Bleeke and
Ernst, 1995; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999). We develop this notion further by illustrating
how a greater number of alliance experiences of an acquiring firm can enhance post-alliance
acquisition performance: a) From a future target selection viewpoint, the number of prior
alliance experiences may serve as an important screening technique for potential acquisition
targets and have a positive performance effect (Kogut, 1991; Arend, 2004; Agarwal, Anand,
Bercovitz, and Croson, 2012); b) consistent with the notion of “learning before doing”
(Pisano, 1994), post-acquisition performance can be facilitated by the learning opportunity
that firms may have due to their exposure to related and/or similar activities as they continue
to cooperate in the post-acquisition organizational context; and c) due to the similarities
between alliance and acquisition activities (Newburry and Zeira, 1997; Zeira and Newburry,
1999), numerous distinct processes and routines may be formed during alliance activities.
These routines and learning may be applied to a post-acquisition context, which may enhance
organizational efficiency in future acquisition integration processes and positively affect
acquisition performance (Agarwal et al., 2012).
Whereas routine formation reinforces the experiential lessons learned from the
routines and further adoption of a certain routine (March, 1981), the nature of prior
organizational activities sets a more favorable stage for initial routinization and memory
formation. When firms partner with organizations of different sizes, structures, purposes, and
regions, the cumulative experience gained from these partnerships increases their breadth of
future search, learning capabilities, and existing routines, thereby increasing their capabilities

40

and efficiency (e.g., Jiang, Tao, and Santoro, 2010; Lavie, 2007; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2006;
Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Stuart, 2000). We believe that by engaging in a higher number
of alliances, an acquirer can adeptly adjust its overall routines and processes and translate
them into value enhancing systems for future acquisitions.
On the other hand, each time a firm’s knowledge or learning is applied, opinions about
the questions of “what works and why they work” are more firmly embedded in managerial
cognition, thus routines become firmly established in an organization (Levitt and March,
1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, we believe that when alliance experience of a
firm is insignificant, it may limit information processing and organizational search, which in
turn may limit the creation of new routines and norms (Huber, 1991) for related organizational
tasks – in this case acquisitions.
Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) argued that when differences in organizational tasks
become too large (for instance, a company operates only in related industries or countries), it
may ultimately hamper learning and a company may find it difficult to understand and
interpret the different knowledge and routines and, as a consequence, will have problems
absorbing and learning from other firms (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and Bell, 1997;
Huber, 1991; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Given that alliance/acquisition capability
development, i.e., routines, memories, knowledge, processes, systems, structures, and skills,
takes place primarily on the program level through a series of deals rather than from individual
deals (Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002), this process requires
multiple alliance agreements for a firm to be able to build routines and draw correct inferences
from previous tasks (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Therefore, we anticipate:
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher the number of strategic alliances, the higher the
likelihood that the acquirer firm would have a superior acquisition performance.

Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Industry
Cognitive psychologists have used a variety of technical terms to indicate transfer
effects in individual learning processes. Some of them have to do with the type of knowledge
being transferred (e.g., motor or cognitive skills, declarative or procedural memory, etc.); the
existence and strength of rules identifying the task (Holland et al. 1986); the existence,
number, order, and type of cues or examples to refer to in the learning (Gick and Holyoak
1983, 1887; Cheng et al. 1986) and transfer processes (Reed et al. 1974, Hayes and Simon
1977); and the learner’s background knowledge (Bransford and Franks 1976, Larkin et al.
1980).
A significant body of organizational learning literature has built on these notions of
individual learning applied to the organizational level. Absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990) is one such extension. Firms with high levels of absorptive capacity learn
quickly from other firms and can develop routines that create economies of scale. Absorptive
capacity refers to “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information,
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Building on this
premise, we argue that prior knowledge in a certain context (e.g., industry) can enhance the
effects of learning from other related tasks.
Additionally, organizations are believed to have frames of reference, structures,
routines, and physical artifacts that reflect knowledge retention (Moorman and Miner, 1997;
Walsh and Ungson, 1991), which is conceptualized as organizational memory. At the
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individual as well as organizational levels, Anderson (1983) proposed that two types of
memory are relevant to organizational learning: a) procedural memory as to how things are
done (e.g., skills and routines) and b) declarative memory in terms of general memory for
facts, events, material forms, and shared information (e.g., reports, summaries, agreements).
We theorize that both of these memory types in alliances will facilitate acquisition
performance. Procedural memory is particularly helpful since it is domain-dependent
(Moorman and Miner, 1998), which is evidently the case for alliances in a particular industry.
From the perspective of the content and level of organizational memory, a firm that has
experience in a specific industry for some time will likely accumulate a high level of
declarative memory about the competitive dynamics and detailed traits of the industry
(Moorman and Miner, 1998) that they will be able to use in the acquisition context.
Given the interplay of absorptive capacity, organizational routines, and memory, we
believe that an acquiring firm’s alliance experience in a target’s industry will likely benefit the
acquirer’s acquisition performance in a focal deal. We believe this occurs for the following
reasons. First, though not in the same task (i.e., alliance vs. acquisition) or with the same
partner (i.e., partner-specific learning), an acquirer’s familiarity with alliance activities within
a target firm’s industry helps them to gain valuable prior knowledge and to develop
organizational memory about similar businesses in the target firm's industry. Second, prior
knowledge of the acquirer in a target firm’s industry enables the acquirer to correctly assess a
target firm’s strengths and capabilities as a potential target (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Third,
business similarity and industry knowledge help the acquirer to draw on previously
established routines and collaborative processes that are specific to the target firm's industry
and use them in the focal acquisition deal. Finally, the acquirer’s level of prior industry
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knowledge facilitates building a post-acquisition relationship of mutual trust, communication,
trust, and reciprocity that are critical for successful post-acquisition integration (Zaheer,
McEvily, Perrone, 1998). Therefore, we predict the following relationship:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): An acquirer firm’s alliance experience in the target firm’s industry
is positively correlated with its acquisition performance.

Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Country
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that organizations need a level of preparedness, in
other words, prior knowledge and absorptive capacity for effective transfer of prior
experience. In this section, we continue to extend this argument of preparedness to the context
of geographical preparedness for transfer of learning between tasks. We believe the level of
preparedness is especially relevant in a multi-task transfer setting, because organizational
ability to engage in effective learning is hindered when multiple parameters of the
learning process are changed simultaneously (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). A vast
body of literature in international business and global strategy established that crossnational distance matters (Ghemawat, 2001). It particularly does so when it relates to
inter-organizational exchanges where differences in norms, values, practices, rules, and
policies result in a lack of contextual knowledge, liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995),
breeding problems of communication, coordination, trust, and uncertainty.
Given this cross-national setting, in addition to declarative and procedural memory,
we theorize on the implications of transactive memory (Wegner, 1986). Wegner proposed
that encoding, storing, and retrieval of memory are facilitated by various types of interactions
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and transactions (hence the name) between and among group members in an organization.
Oftentimes, labels and generalization by individuals play an important role in such transactive
memory. We believe transactive memory is especially relevant in the context of cross-national
inter-organizational exchange. Dyadic distance matters in an inter-organizational exchange
process: higher geographic, economic, political, cultural, administrative, and psychic
distance make it more difficult to impose the acquiring firm’s dominant logic (Verbeke,
2010).
We propose that experience with international alliances, particularly partnerships
with other firms in a target firm’s country, is likely to be valuable in reducing the
problems of liability of foreignness, information asymmetry in cross-national setting
(Robson, Katsikeas, Bello, 2008; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993), and issues of transactive
memory building in a cross-national setting. Thus, we draw on prior research to suggest
that familiarity with a target’s home country, albeit in a different task, makes
international acquisitions more successful. Whereas issues arising from information
asymmetry and difficulties due to transactive memory in a cross-national setting increase
the difficulties of pre-acquisition negotiation (Dikova, et al., 2010) and post-acquisition
integration (Zander and Zander, 2010; Verbeke 2010), leading to an inferior acquisition
performance. Therefore, we predict the following relationship:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): An acquirer firm’s alliance experience in the target firm’s country is
positively correlated with its acquisition performance.
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Moderating Role of Acquirer’s Acquisition Experience
According to Thorndike (1903) and Tversky (1977), transfer of learning in a multitask setting may occur when learning in one context/task enhances (positive transfer) or
undermines (negative transfer) performance in another related context/task. Transfer of
learning may also take different forms: near transfer (to closely related contexts /tasks) and far
transfer (to rather different contexts /tasks) (Perkin and Salomon, 1992). Gagne (1966) used a
skill hierarchy to distinguish between lateral (transfer between different tasks) and vertical
(transfer between lower and higher level skills) transfer of learning. We believe that transfer of
learning from alliance experience to acquisition performance is a case both of lateral (due to
the difference in alliance and acquisition activities) and vertical transfer (from collaborative
relationship to increased interdependency and resource commitment in acquisitions).
Alliances and acquisitions, though the two alternative governance structures share
commonality (Wang and Zajac, 2007; Zeira and Newburry, 1999), thus are considered two
different corporate activities. Their similarities can be perceived in an organization’s search
for alliance/acquisition partners, negotiation and evaluation of the deal, and post-deal
organization and coordination (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). More importantly, at the corporate
level, both of these activities are commonly managed by the same department, which is
critical to firm-level learning. Despite these similarities, alliances and acquisitions also
have several differences that may complicate the transfer of learning when firms
implement acquisitions relying on their prior alliance experiences. Alliances and
acquisitions are alternative governance structures requiring different levels of control and
coordination (Wang and Zajac, 2007). From a deal-making standpoint, these activities
also differ since acquisitions tends to be characterized by a much more formal and
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extensive due diligence (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). On the other hand, alliance structures
tend to be more transitional in nature (Phene and Tallman 2012; Reuer, Zollo, and Singh,
2002; Ariño and De La Torre, 1998; Doz and Hamel, 1998), involving a co-evolution of
trust, control, and learning (Inkpen and Currall 2004). Notwithstanding these differences,
a case has been made in the literature that past alliance experiences might be sufficiently
similar in the dimensions of task, process, or context to some acquisitions to influence the
latter’s performance. Therefore, positive experience spillovers may occur due to the
similarity between alliance (learned activity in one task) and acquisition activities (the
one to which learning is applied) (Thorndike, 1903; Tversky, 1977).
Considering both the similarities and differences in alliances and acquisitions, we
argue that an acquirer’s acquisition related memory, routines, capabilities, etc. will
enhance its learning from alliance activities. Therefore, we expect an interaction between
an acquirer’s prior acquisition experience and alliance experience in predicting the
relationship between alliance experience and subsequent acquisition performance:
Hypotheses 4 (H4): An acquirer’s acquisition experience will positively moderate the
following relationships between:
(H4a) acquirer’s alliance experience and acquisition performance, such that the
positive relationship will be strengthened by the acquirer’s recent acquisition
experience.
(H4b) acquirer’s alliance experience in target firm’s industry and acquisition
performance, such that the positive relationship will be strengthened by the
acquirer’s recent acquisition experience.
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(H4c) acquirer’s alliance experience in target firm’s country and acquisition
performance, such that the positive relationship will be strengthened by the
acquirer’s recent acquisition experience.

METHODOLOGY
A detailed description of the sample, data sources, variables, and measures used
to empirically test the hypotheses of the study are provided in the following section:

Sample and Data Sources
Data on alliance and mergers & acquisitions (M&A) announcements were
extracted for the years 1990–2012. The initial sample consisted of all the entries of
alliances and M&As compiled from Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum
database’s M&A and joint-venture modules. The initial sample included all the alliance
deal announcements during 1991–2010 and M&A announcements during 1991–2012.
Next, from the M&A sample, for hypotheses testing, due to availability of data for the US
firms, we included only those firms that come from US origin and furthermore, those cases
where acquisitions were actually completed. In other words, we are interested in only those
acquisitions that are initiated and completed by US firms within years 1994 and 2010. Though
the data is available prior to 1994, acquisitions until 1994 were excluded since we had to
measure the alliance experience variable which is based on 4 years data prior to the focal
acquisition and since this set of data starts from 1991. Finally, we complemented our data,
by extracting a number of financial variables (e.g., ROE) from the Compustat database.
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Measures
Dependent Variable
Acquisition Performance: Acquisition performance attempts to capture the
superiority of a firm’s ex post financial performance, given the event of a completed
acquisition. We used accounting based measures to calculate an acquiring firm’s
performance from a focal acquisition. Consistent with Zollo and Reuer (2010) and Meeks
and Meeks (1981), we used a measure capturing the change in return on equity of a focal
acquiring firm following a completed acquisition. In other words, performance was
measured as the difference between the return on equity (ROE) of the acquiring firm two
years after the acquisition relative to one year prior to the acquisition.
An alternate method to measure acquisition performance is to use a cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) value given an M&A announcement. It is an ex ante marketbased proxy for actual returns based on the stock market reactions given the
announcement of an M&A event. Researchers using this event-study method have used a
variety of a short to a long window ranging from 7 days to 241 days around an
acquisition announcement (e.g., Zaheer, et al., 2010; McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes,
2008; Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006). While CAR is one of the most widely
used measures for capturing M&A performance, it has some major drawbacks. First, the
subjective judgment of the researcher in terms of using a small/medium/long window
opens the interpretation of the results for criticism. Second, since event-study method
entails using the collective response of stock market investors regarding the potential
performance implications of an M&A, it works as a proxy rather than gauging the actual
performance effects of an M&A.
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To address these potential issues with event-study methods, following Kim and
Finkelstein (2009) and Zollo and Reuer (2010), we opted to use an accounting based
measure for this variable, e.g., ROE extracted from the Compustat database.
Additionally, we chose ROE over the measure of return on assets (ROA) since our
sample includes both service (low fixed asset) and manufacturing (high fixed asset) type
firms.
Explanatory Variables
Acquirer’s Recent Alliance Experience (H1): To observe the performance
implications of organizational routines and learning accumulate from recent alliance
experience of an acquiring firm, we created a measure of recent alliance experience by
capturing an acquiring firms’ alliance deals. The underlying assumption is that with
every alliance deal, a future acquirer develops valuable insight and routines (Gulati,
Lavie, Singh, 2009; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002), and building on related routines,
acquiring firms gain superior acquisition performance (Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan,
2006). However, as we discussed in the theoretical background section of this paper,
recency is an important dimension to the relevance of experience and routines (Zollo and
Reuer, 2010; Ingram and Simons, 2002; Ingram and Baum 1997; Argote and Epple,
1990).
To operationalize this variable, we track the acquiring firms’ number of alliances
deals prior to a focal acquisition attempt. In this case, the focal acquirer firm is the one
that completes an acquisition attempt. Furthermore, our alliance experience variable is
calculated based on the number of cross-border alliances completed by a focal acquirer
within 4 years prior to the focal acquisition.
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Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Industry (H2): This variable
attempts to capture a focal acquirer’s partnering experience in a specific industry that
may be applicable to a future acquisition. This variable is an ordinal variable representing
the number of alliances an acquiring firm had in the same industry, as differentiated by
the SIC codes of the target firm’s industry within 4 years prior to the focal acquisition. To
operationalize this variable, we created a new variable based on the number of alliance
partnerships by searching the specific windows of alliance data given the announcement
date of a focal acquisition. According to Schilling (2009), of the most popular alliance
databases, the SDC Platinum covers the widest range of industry sectors between 1985
and 2005. We used Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to denote industry
specific alliance experience consistent with Anand and Khanna (2000) and Jiang, Tao,
and Santoro (2010).
Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Country (H3): Similar to the
previous explanatory variable, this variable is intended as a proxy of the acquirer’s
routines and experience in particular country that may be applied to enhance future
acquisition performance in the same national context. This variable is also an ordinal
variable representing the number of alliances an acquiring firm had in the same nation of
its target in the focal acquisition. This is measured by taking into account alliance
participants’ primary nation codes in the alliance deals that were completed within 4
years prior to the focal acquisition. According to Schilling (2009), of the all-sector
datasets, SDC Platinum appears to be the most inclusive in terms of types of nations (as
denoted by participants’ nation codes) represented. We used participants’ two digit nation
codes to capture an acquiring firm’s country specific alliance experience.
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Acquirer’s Acquisition Experience (H4): This variable captures an acquiring
firm’s experience, organizational memory, and routines developed from recent
acquisition deals. Although acquisition experience is not a direct measure of
organizational learning, it has been extensively used in the literature as a proxy, and can
be reasonably expected to yield a strong positive correlation between the number of
previous acquisitions and development of acquisition capabilities and routines (Zaheer, et
al., 2010). We measure this ordinal variable by taking into account the frequency of prior
acquisition deals completed by an acquirer firm within 4 years prior to the focal deal
(Zaheer et al., 2010; Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006; Hayward, 2002; Argote and
Epple, 1990).
Control Variables
Several decades of work on understanding acquisition performance identifies
numerous firm-, industry-, country-, and deal-specific variables that may relate to an
acquirer’s superior performance. In addition to the main predictor variables described
above, to address the acquiring firm’s resources and possible confounding effects of other
acquisitions on accounting or financial returns, we used the following control variables in
our model:
Acquiring Firm’s Characteristics:
a) Acquirer Size (CV1): We used a proxy for an acquirer’s size; measured as the
logarithm of the acquiring firm’s total assets in billions of dollars for the year before the
acquisition event (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Haleblian et al., 2006).
b) Acquirer’s debt to equity ratio (CV2) to proxy for the availability of financial
resources available to the acquiring firm.
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Target Firm’s Characteristics:
c) Characteristics of the target firm should also influence acquisition outcomes.
We theorized in the hypotheses development section that international acquisition
strategies involve an inherent liability of foreignness (Zaheer 1995). Thus, cross-border
targets are particularly difficult to evaluate prior to acquisition and integrate postacquisition. We control for this possibility of Foreign Targets (CV3) through a binary
variable. If the target firm is from the United States then it is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.
d) Since our sample includes both publicly traded and privately owned target
firms, to enhance the generalizability of our findings, we included a variable as to
whether the target is a Public Target (CV4), coded as 1 if the target is publicly listed and
0 otherwise (Dikova et al., 2010; Zaheer, et al., 2010).
Deal Characteristics:
We also used a number of deal specific control variables:
e) Acquisition Deal Attitude (CV5): Hostile and competitive acquisitions invoke
various types of pre-acquisition and post-integration resistance from the target firm’s
management. If the deal attitude is friendly we coded this variable to be 1, otherwise, 0.
f) Relative size (CV6) of the target and acquirer: Prior studies have provided
ample evidence that the relative sizes of a target and an acquirer affect acquisition
outcomes. This variable is calculated as the ratio of a target firm’s total assets and an
acquiring firm’s total assets (Haleblian, et al., 2006).
Finally, we used binary variables to control for differences in year specific and
industry-based (SIC codes) market variations. We then analyzed the data using ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression analysis.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The descriptive statistics, i.e., mean, standard deviations, and bivariate correlation
estimates for our measures are presented, respectively, in Table 1 and Table 2. Evaluation
of the correlation matrix reveals that there are no significantly high correlations among
the variables of the study that could confound results due to multicollinearity leading to
variance inflation. Our results made it evident that among the explanatory and the control
variables, none of the variance inflation factors (VIF) exceeded the conventionally
followed cutoff limit of 10 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Netter, 2004; Kleinbaum, Kupper,
and Muller, 1988). More specifically, the VIF estimates of all the variables used in our
study were below 9.85, suggesting that there was no significant threat of multicollinearity
in our model.

Table 3 presents the results of OLS regression analyses applied to test each of the
hypotheses involving the change in accounting performance of the focal acquirer. Model
I is a baseline specification that includes all of the control variables, Model II
incorporates acquiring firm’s alliance experience terms, and Model III and IV include
acquirer’s prior alliance experience in target’s industry and experience in target’s nation,
respectively. Furthermore, Model V introduces the moderating variables, i.e., acquiring
firm’s acquisition experience and its interactive effects in the same equation with the
previously included independent variables to test the three baseline hypotheses.

In the first hypothesis, we anticipated that prior and recent alliance experience of
an acquirer will positively relate to its acquisition experience. The empirical analyses
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provided no statistically significant support for the hypothesized effects of indicating that
recent alliance experience of the acquirer has no direct, linear effect on the change in
return on equity (ROE) of the acquirer. In other words, organizational learning at the
alliance program level may not have any substantial implications for acquisition
performance. In the second hypothesis, we predicted that an acquirer’s prior alliance
experience in a future target’s industry will positively be associated with its change in
ROE over a window of 3 years. We did not find a statistical support for H2. Both of these
hypotheses were built on the arguments of declarative and procedural memory.
Our third hypotheses expected a positive association between an acquirer’s prior
alliance experience in the target’s firm’s country location and its superior acquisition
performance. This hypothesis drew on the arguments of the difficulties of interorganizational interactions and transactions at a cross-border setting. Consistent with our
arguments, we find statistical significance in favor of H3 (p<0.05). The results
underscore the importance of country specific transactive memory, albeit in an alliance
context, for the improvement of acquisition performance.
In light of the arguments on the relatedness between the task and processes of
alliances and acquisitions, we made several predictions involving acquirer’s prior
acquisition experience at the program level. Contrary to our expectations and previously
conducted studies, H4 was not found statistically significant for our sample of US
acquirers. This suggested a lack of association between acquirer’s prior and recent
acquisition experience and enhanced acquisition performance. In addition, when we
tested for the moderating role of an acquirer’s prior acquisition experience on the initially
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stated relationship in our baseline hypotheses concerning various types of alliance
experience and acquisition performance, we find some support.
In view of the moderator, quite contrary to prior findings on acquirer acquisition
experience, in the full and final model (Model IV) we find no statistical support for the
main effect of this variable for acquisition performance. However, we found that it
interacts with industry- and nation-specific prior alliance experience, albeit in the
direction contrary to our expectation. However, considering the directionality of our
prediction we did not find statistical support for H4a, H4b, and H4c. In all three of the
cases, the interaction terms supported a negative association with our dependent variable.
This confirms a weakening effect of acquirer’s acquisition experience on the positive
relationship between prior industry- and nation- related alliance experience. Possible
explanation for this inconsistency may be attributable to the ideas that managers of
acquiring firms: a) may either be falling into “competency traps” by acting rather
aggressively while making meaning of their prior related experience in two related, yet
different tasks, and/or, b) may not be recognizing the underlying differences in alliances
and acquisitions, and are over-generalizing while applying their routines and learning in
two different contexts.
The overall results of our analyses empirically support our overarching theoretical
arguments. Specifically, the analyses offer general support for our hypotheses that drew
on how various types of declarative, procedural, and transactive dimensions of
organizational memory determine the transfer of learning given some relatedness and
difference of tasks in an inter-dependent setting. In both of these cases, we found no
support for the hypotheses H4a, H4b, and H4c).
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In line with findings in previous studies on prior alliance experience, we were
unable to find empirical support for the relationship between general alliance experience
and acquisition experience, even after considering only the recent experience. But,
interestingly, and consistent with our prediction, the results confirm the relevance of
related experience in industry and national contexts for facilitating the transfer effects of
learning in a multi-task setting. One possible explanation for the inconsistency in our
predictions and empirical findings for the unsupported hypotheses may be attributable to
the arguments that managers of acquiring firms: a) may be falling into “competency
traps” and aggressively applying their prior alliance experience related experience during
post-acquisition phase which, albeit similar, requires a vast set of skills and experience
due to the post-acquisition integration, and/or, b) may not be recognizing the underlying
differences in alliances and acquisitions, and are erroneously over-generalizing based on
their learning in alliances to apply their routines in an acquisition context.
More importantly, empirical results for the H3 supports the explanation that
related prior experience, routine, and preparedness in targets’ country context developed
though an acquirer’s recent alliance experience beyond partner/target-specific experience,
help to create certain types of useful memory to facilitate a superior acquisition
performance. This finding adds further explanations to the vast body of literature that
examines acquisition success/failure. It also extends the streams of literature on alliance
portfolio and acquisition program perspective that explain performance outcomes of these
activities in a cross-form setting of organizational learning.
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LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Like any other study, ours has a number of limitations which, if carefully crafted,
may be addressed in future endeavors. For instance, we did not explicitly measure postformation management processes in the context of alliances or acquisitions. Future
research could improve upon this, also incorporating other dimensions that can affect the
transfer process such as decision-making speed, the structure of project management
teams, communication processes, and so forth to compare both the tasks of alliance and
acquisition. In addition, since we focus on announced deals based on publicly available
data, we are unable to capture the actual routine involved in the process. As a result,
drawing on previous empirical studies, we used a number of proxies to operationalize our
variables. Further studies using case-based and survey-based method may provide further
understanding of these learning outcomes. As with other well-published studies, despite
the prevalent use and richness of SDC Platinum database for strategic alliance research,
our empirical results may be somewhat limited by occasional coding error given the
reporting standards and availability of data points (Schilliing, 2009). Furthermore, we
used only accounting based measures to quantify acquisition performance. Future studies
may use an ex ante performance measure (CAR) from the stock market reactions to
further support the results. Given the inconclusive evidence in favor of the relevance of
acquirer’s prior alliance experience for acquisition performance, it may make sense to
explore various characteristics of alliances (e.g., depth, breadth, or patterns of alliance
formation) to further examine this relationship between alliance experience and
acquisition performance. Lastly, the results of this study should be generalized with
caution, since our sample includes completed acquisitions by only US firms.

58

Our results have three broad managerial implications. First, our empirical results
generally confirm that a future acquirer’s prior involvement in specific types of strategic
alliances can enhance its acquisition performance. In other words, a generalized corporate
development capability (Zaheer et al., 2010; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) may not ensure a
positive experience spillover between alliances and acquisitions in general. However,
from an information-processing and specialization standpoint, decision-makers of a firm
would greatly benefit from relevant alliance experience, given certain learning conditions
are met. For instance, alliance experience can be particularly helpful for the success of
acquisitions in some well-defined and familiar contexts (i.e., in certain industries and
nations) as we identify. Second, our results suggest that managers would benefit if they
complement their experience in on task (alliances) by drawing on their experience in
other related tasks (acquisitions), especially when the contexts of learning are similar to
encourage positive transfer effects of learning. In other words, managers need to be
careful of inadvertently or inappropriately generalizing from prior alliance experiences to
the management of their acquisition activities.

CONTRIBUTION
Overall, this study attempted to contribute to corporate development activities
literature by theorizing on the implications of experience, memory, routine, and learning
in a multi-task and interdependent learning context. Building on recent studies (Zollo and
Reuer, 2010; Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee, 2010; Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz, and
Croson, 2012) that integrated the research streams of alliance and acquisition activities, we
attempted to inform our understanding of acquisition performance by theorizing on the
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dimensions of memory and learning mechanisms that are mutually inclusive for the tasks
of alliance and acquisition. Since extant studies investigated acquisition-related properties
and alliance properties at the dyad level result in superior acquisition performance, we
contribute to this research stream by considering the effects of accumulated learning in
related tasks and contexts for superior performance in a cross-form setting. In other
words, we particularly highlighted the importance of the relevance and the elements of
learning (Thorndike 1960; Gagne, 1966) at the alliance program level (i.e., cumulative
learning from alliance). This enables us to recognize how experience gained in a firm’s
alliance portfolio may positively relate to a focal firm’s acquisition performance.
Therefore, this study makes the following contributions:
a) Developing a further expansive theory regarding understanding the effective
management of acquisitions.
b) Recognizing that given certain dimensions of relatedness, organizational learning
based on the alliance program/portfolio is transferrable in a multi-task setting.
c) Emphasizing the relevance of procedural, declarative, and transactive memory
dimensions (Thorndike 1960; Gagne, 1966) for a superior transfer effect of
learning in a multi-task setting.
d) Underscoring the depth, e.g., specialization of learning, exploitation matters
greatly to learning spillovers across corporate activities, especially when
complemented by breadth, e.g., diversity of learning, exploration (March, 1991,
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).
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DISSERTATION CONCLUSION
With a view to understand the interdependencies of corporate-level strategic activities,
this dissertation took an integrative approach and conducted two empirical studies
synthesizing alliance and acquisition research. Study I analyzed alliance and acquisition
research using a relational and dyadic framework to understand the corporate strategy of
future target selection. Study II integrated alliance portfolio research and acquisition program
perspectives for a organizational level of analysis vis-à-vis an activity based learning to
examine corporate-level acquisition performance. Overall, this dissertation attempted a step
toward taking stock of a vast body of extant research in two parallel streams to extend our
understanding from a broader corporate development perspective. As the field of strategic
management matures, given last 5 decades of rich scholarship, this new domain of crossstream studies promises to open further avenues of research for a holistic understanding of
multinational corporations’ strategy and performance.
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FIGURE 1: OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK OF THE DISSERTATION
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FIGURE 3 - STUDY II: CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE STUDY
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TABLE 1 - STUDY I: CORRELATIONS ESTIMATES FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION
[1]

Variables

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[1] Acquisition Attempt

1

[2] Prior partnership

-0.0791 1

[3] Multi-nationality

0.2107

[4] Organizational Type
Difference

-0.0595 0.0645

-0.0519 1

[5] Intangibility

-0.1787 0.0292

-0.0414 0.0792

[6] Prior acquisition
experience

0.0457

[7] Prior alliance experience

-0.0303 0.1409

0.0101

[8] Number of alliance
partners

-0.1986 0.0337

-0.1033 -0.1219 -0.0432 -0.044

[9] Target attractiveness
[10] Acquirer’s Public
Status

0.0461

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

-0.0132 1

-0.0079 0.0468

-0.0056 0.0483

-0.0282 0.0466

1

-0.0146 -0.0098 1
0.0554

0.062

0.256

1
-0.0456

-0.0135 -0.0087 0.9989 0.275

-0.0096 -0.0356 0.1734
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-0.027

0.0987

1
-0.0456

1

-0.0654

-0.0265 1

TABLE 2 - STUDY I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Prior partnership

0.009

0.097

Multi-nationality

0.591

0.491

Ownership type difference

0.512

0.499

Intangibility

0.909

0.287

Prior acquisition experience

4.184

29.3

Prior alliance experience

6.308

18.640

Number of alliance partners

8.406

23.192

Target attractiveness

4.095

10.475

Acquirer’s public status

7.543

21.583
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TABLE 3 - STUDY I: ESTIMATES FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS

Variables
CV1 Prior alliance experience

CV2 Number of alliance partners

CV3 Acquirer’s Public Status

CV4 Prior acquisition experience

CV5 Target attractiveness

H1 Prior partnership

H2 Multi-nationality

(I)
Model 1
-0.00872**

(II)
Model 2
-0.00972***

(III)
Model 3
-0.00929**

(IV)
Model 4
-0.00870***

(V)
Model 5
-0.00741***

(0.000517)

(0.000514)

(0.000514)

(0.000512)

(0.000522)

-1.173**

-1.206***

-1.294***

-1.252**

-1.183***

(0.0326)

(0.0326)

(0.0331)

(0.0326)

(0.0337)

-0.289**

-0.304***

-0.233***

-0.214**

-0.103***

(0.0249)

(0.0249)

(0.0252)

(0.0254)

(0.0262)

-2.91e-05**

-2.94e-05***

-2.95e-05**

-2.82e-05***

-2.23e-05***

(3.12e-06)

(3.09e-06)

(3.13e-06)

(3.07e-06)

(2.97e-06)

0.00869**

0.00878***

0.00881**

0.00843***

0.00665***

(0.000908)

(0.000901)

(0.000911)

(0.000895)

(0.000862)

-3.369**

-3.238***

(0.271)

(0.272)
-0.470***
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-0.680***

(0.0419)

(0.114)

H3 Ownership Type Difference

-0.419**

-0.308***

(0.0210)

(0.0217)

H4 Intangibility

-1.113**

-1.045***

(0.0453)

(0.0466)

1.785**

1.847***

2.089**

2.838**

1.637***

(0.0698)

(0.0700)

(0.0716)

(0.0820)

(0.0621)

Observations

43,469

43,469

43,469

43,469

43,469

chi-square

4664

4171

4571

4825

4583

Constant

Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Year binary variables included.
Note: N = 43,469. (*) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01; (***) less than 0.001
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TABLE 1 - STUDY II: CORRELATIONS ESTIMATES
Variables
[1] Acquisition performance
[2] Acquirer size

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

1

[3] Acquirer’s debt to equity
ratio

-0.0165

0.1004

1

[4] Foreign targets

-0.0021

0.2479

0.2922

1

0.0022

0.0056

0.4271

0.379

[6] Deal attitude

[7] Relative size

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

1

0.0037 -0.0116 -0.0351 -0.0253 -0.0035
0.0157 -0.0021 -0.0192

1

-0.0029

0.029

0.0862

0.0683

0.0004
1
0.0412 0.0068 0.001

[9] Alliance experience in
Target’s Industry

0.0002

0.1476

0.294

0.3224

0.2208 0.0195 0.1044

0.1154

1

[10] Alliance experience in
Target’s Nation

-0.0056

0.0058 -0.0512 -0.0368 -0.0223 0.0033 0.0446

0.0177

-0.0049

[11] Acquirer’s acquisition
experience

-0.0023 -0.0122 -0.0304 -0.0575

0.0278 0.0034 0.0035

-0.0488

[8] Prior alliance experience

[11]

1
0.0028

[5] Public target

[6]

-0.018 -0.0108
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1

1

-0.0831 -0.0022

1

TABLE 2 - STUDY II: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Acquisition performance

-0.133

189.860

Acquirer size

6.835

2.289

Acquirer’s debt to equity ratio

2.443

13.188

Foreign targets

0.175

0.380

Public target

0.127

0.333

Deal attitude

0.946

0.226

Relative size

0.386

3.839

Prior alliance experience

8.406

23.192

Alliance experience in Target’s
Industry

4.095

10.475

Alliance experience in Target’s
Nation

7.543

21.583

Acquirer’s acquisition experience

9.609

20.409
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TABLE 3 - STUDY II: ESTIMATES FROM ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ANALYSES

Variables
CV1 Acquirer size

CV2 Acquirer’s debt to equity
ratio

CV3 Foreign targets

CV4 Public target

CV5 Deal attitude

CV6 Relative size

(I)
Model 1
0.0801

(II)
Model 2
-5.442*

(III)
Model 3
-5.419*

(IV)
Model 4
-5.364*

(V)
Model 5
-5.361*

(0.141)

(2.931)

(2.940)

(2.949)

(2.967)

5.871***

24.22**

24.51**

24.41**

24.43**

(1.721)

(10.90)

(10.94)

(10.97)

(11.08)

14.72*

50.95

47.79

50.68

50.77

(8.001)

(71.61)

(72.08)

(72.38)

(72.97)

-0.503

-13.01

-12.61

-12.80

-12.81

(3.597)

(17.62)

(17.69)

(17.74)

(17.84)

0.0108

-0.625

-1.758

-5.635

-5.634

(0.243)

(11.03)

(11.27)

(12.69)

(12.74)

-1.341

61.39*

64.29*

61.48*

61.79

(2.672)

(34.42)

(34.95)

(35.29)

(41.52)

3.703

-4.640

-4.408

-4.650

-4.647
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0.0801
H1 Acquirer’s alliance
experience (AALE)
H2 Alliance experience in
target’s Industry (AETI)
H3 Alliance experience in
target’s nation (AETN)
H4 Acquirer’s acquisition
experience (AACE)

-5.442*

-5.419*

-5.364*

-5.361*

-0.243

-0.296

-0.291

-0.291

(0.174)

(0.201)

(0.202)

(0.203)

9.215

8.542

12.94

12.95

(11.47)

(11.57)

(13.31)

(13.42)

61.09***

62.42***

59.83**

59.74**

(23.11)

(23.32)

(23.69)

(24.53)

0.116

-0.0187

0.123

0.104

(0.201)

(0.324)

(0.387)

(1.376)

0.00128

0.00122

0.00122

(0.00242)

(0.00242)

(0.00244)

-0.160

-0.160

(0.238)

(0.239)

H4a AALE*AACE

H4b AETI*AACE

H4c AETN*AACE

0.0197
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-43.92***

-213.3**

-212.3**

-213.0**

-213.1**

(12.90)

(77.47)

(78.76)

(79.84)

(80.24)

Observations

5,396

314

314

314

314

R-squared

0.011

0.295

0.297

0.300

0.300

Constant

Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Year variables included. Year and industry binary variables included.
Note: N = 5,396. (*) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (**) less than 0.05; (***) less than 0.01
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